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COMMENTS

In relation to the discharge rules of a quasi surety, we have seen that a quasi
surety receives a pro tanto discharge to the extent of the value of the land,
whether by an extension of the maturity date, or by refusal of tender, or under
the rule of Pain v. Packard. In the case of an extension of the maturity date or
a refusal of tender, the time for computation is the date of the extension or
tender; while under the Pain rule, the time for computation should, it is submitted, be the last day of the excusable delay following the request to proceed
against the primary fund. If the value of the land at the time for computation is
more than or equal to the debt, the pro tanto discharge coincidentally results
in a complete discharge of the quasi surety for any deficiency as did the
"tender" discharge in the Fermac case. If the value of the land at the time for
computation is less than the debt itself, the pro tanto discharge results in a
release only from liability for the deficiency accruing subsequent to the time for
computation. It does not result in a release from liability for a differential
between the debt and the value of the land accruing prior to the time for
computation.
THE DEFINiTION OF AN OFFENSE IN THE NEW YORK
PENAL STATUTES
INTRODUCTION

Although the New York Penal Law defines a crime as "an act or omission
forbidden by law and punishable upon conviction . . . , there have existed
in the law certain acts of a lesser criminal nature, which, although punishable
by the state, have always been excepted from this definition.2 Such acts are
referred to by a variety of names including: offenses, quasi-crimes, police violations, or police or traffic infractions. Although these offenses are recognized
to be essentially criminal, it is equally well recognized that they are not crimes
but rather of a sui generis nature, sharing some of the characteristics of crimes
and at the same time being distinguishable from them. 3 Determining what
1. N.Y. Pen. Law § 2.
2. "In passing we may mention a third class of offenses which are neither felonies prosecuted by indictment and triable by a common-law jury ...
nor misdemeanors triable by
Courts of Special Session with or without the statutory jury of six .. . , but patty offensa
triable summarily by a magistrate without a jury." Cooley v. Wilder, 234 App. Div. 266,
255 N.Y. Supp. 213 (4th Dep't 1932).

Although this comment concerns itself principally with offenses as created in the New
York penal statutes, it should be pointed out that almost every New York statute creates
crimes and offenses covering matters peculiar to the subject matter which the statute covers.
Offenses created in the various statutes are of the same nature as offenses created in the
Penal Law, and the procedures applicable to them are essentially identical in every repect.

This comment will not consider certain provisions of law unique to minors, e.g. proceedings respecting wayward minors (N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. tit. VI-A), which, although tech-

nically offenses, are more properly considered as a class by themselves. People v. Chesley,
2S2 App. Div. S21, 123 N.Y.S.2d 42 (3d Dep't 1953).
3. "It appears that, however inaccurate or illogical the distinction may be, summary proceedings for petty offenses leading to disorder have been considered not as prose-cutions for
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violations constitute offenses, and to what measure they shall be prosecuted
as crimes has accounted for some measure of confusion in criminal law. The
lack of statutory provisions precisely defining offenses has served to abet rather
than allay this confusion.
Petty offenses were unknown at common law and any actions violative of
the social order were either felonies or misdemeanors subject to severe penalties.
But as English society developed and the problems of social living became more
complex, there developed a need to discourage, but not criminally punish, many
of the public nuisances and trivial disorders which interrupted community
life. 4 Thus there developed a system authorizing justices of the peace to punish
perpetrators of a variety of these disorderly offenses such as drunkenness,
swearing and vagrancy.8
In New York, the Act of February, 1788, substantially duplicated the
provisions of the English statutes concerned with disorderly conduct.0 Later,
with the adoption of the Revised Statutes, other acts of a quasi-criminal nature
were added including such opportunists as "common gamblers, rope dancers,
and showmen."' 7 This expansion has continued to the present day, so that the
word "offense" now encompasses a multitude of acts, including many foreign
to the early statutes.
OFFENSES IN NEW Yopx

Since all crimes are statutory in New York,8 it is the function of the legislature to designate whether a given violation should be treated as a crime or
merely as an offense. Although at times the merit of making a distinction
between a crime and any other type of criminal conduct has been criticized
by the courts,9 the legislature has, if not always too consistently, recognized
and applied this distinction.10 However, the failure of the legislature to adopt
any standard in determining what acts they will designate mere offenses as
crimes, but for offenses against police regulations." Stienert v. Sobey, 14 App. Div. 505,
508, 44 N.Y. Supp. 146, 148 (2d Dep't 1897).
4. "The peace and security of the community were threatened by homeless able-bodied
vagrants who supported themselves by preying on society, and refused to work for their
living. The state, therefore, found it necessary to suppress these vagrants, and to distinguish between them and the impotent poor, who were unable to support themselves.
The former must be dealt with by the criminal law; the latter were the fit objects of
charity." 4 Holdsworth, History of English Law 607 (1922).
5. Kerr, Student's Blackstone 515 (12th ed. 1896).
6. Murphy, Proceedings in a Magistrates Court Under the Laws of New York, 24
Fordham L. Rev. 53 (1955).
7. Duffy v. People, 6 Hill (N.Y.) 75 (1843).
8. N.Y. Pen. Law § 22. This section abolishes all common law offenses. People v. Knapp,
206 N.Y. 373, 99 N.E. 841 (1911).
9. People v. Harvey, 307 N.Y. 588, 123 N.E.2d 81 (1954); People v. MacAffer, 282 App.
Div. 287, 123 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dep't 1953); Stienert v. Sobey, 14 App. Div. 505, 44 N.Y.
Supp. 146 (2d Dep't 1897).
10. People v. Fox, 205 N.Y. 490, 99 N.E. 147 (1912); People v. MacAffer, 282 App. Div.
287, 123 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dep't 1953); People v. Collins, 238 App. Div. 592, 265 N.Y. Supp.
475 (1st Dep't 1933).
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contrasted with crimes has led to a measure of uncertainty in the interpretation
of the penal statutes. Typical of this inconsistency is the seemingly arbitrary
distinction" between section 720 (disorderly conduct as a misdemeanor) and
section 722 (disorderly conduct as an offense) in the Penal Law. The essential
difference between these two sections is merely that the misdemeanor section
applies to conduct offensive to some one person while the offense section deals
with acts offensive to a group of persons or to the public at large.
PUNISHENT

The courts of many jurisdictions, in order to distinguish between crimes and
offenses, rely on the test of punishment provided. A popular rule of thumb
often employed in this country is that an offense is not to be punishable by a
penalty greater than thirty days imprisonment and a fine of one hundred
dollars,' 2 but this test is clearly inapplicable in New York, there being several
offenses in the Penal Law punishable by as much as six months confinement.
Further the New York statutes completely lack any thread of uniformity
between the punishment provided and the grade assigned. For example, vagrancy, 13 disorderly conduct, 14 violations of the disorderly persons statute,1 5 and
public intoxication, 16 all held to be mere offenses, are punishable by six months
imprisonment. On the other hand, the unlawful possession of an identification
card issued by the United Nations, expressly declared to be a misdemeanor, 17
is punishable by not more than fifty dollars fine or ten days imprisonment or
both, a substantially lighter penalty than that to which one found guilty of
any of the offenses mentioned above might find himself subject. Similarly, one
who fails to provide his motor boat with a muffler is a criminal,18 guilty of a misdemeanor but is punishable by no greater penalty, if he is a first offender, than
a fine, not exceeding twenty-five dollars. These and other sections of the Penal
Law show that any attempt to distinguish between offenses and misdemeanors
from the standpoint of punishment would be futile.
INTENT
EXPc-ESsED LEGISLATI
The only method of determining whether a given violation of law is an offense
or a crime is that of expressed legislative intent. Such intent has been expressed
either by providing that the violation shall not be a crime, as in the case of
traffic infractions,'9 or by indicating simply that one violating a given section
11. "... [I]t is difficult to defend with logic the proposition that such an offense [disorderly conduct] which may lead to six months imprisonment, is not a crime." People v.
MlacAffer, 282 App. Div. 287, 123 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dep't 1953).
12. District of Columbia v. Colts, 232 U.S. 63 (1930).
13. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 8S7.
14. N.Y. Pen. Law § 722.
15. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 899.
16. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1221.
17. N.Y. Pen. Law § 966.
13. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1510.
19. "Except that the acts defined as traffic infractions by the vehicle and traffic law, heretofore or hereafter committed, are not crimes." N.Y. Pen. Law § 2; N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic
Law § 2(29).
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"shall be guilty of an offense," or, as in the case of vagrants and disorderly 22
persons by categorizing them under the heading of "special proceedings of a
criminal nature." With the exception of public intoxication, 2 there is no case
where a violation of a section of the Penal Law has been held to be merely an
"offense" unless the statute itself so expressly provides. Conversely, by statutory provision24 every violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law is an offense
(traffic infraction) unless it is expressly declared to be otherwise.
In the case of public intoxication 25 the courts were presented with the problem of discerning the intent of the legislature in the absence of any express
provision. Originally this violation was declared to be a misdemeanor but the
words "is guilty of a misdemeanor" were subsequently deleted by the legislature. 26 In People v. Reson27 it was held that the elimination of that phrase
did not alter the criminal character of the section and evinced no intent on the
part of the legislature to reduce public intoxication from the status of a crime,
since under section 2928 it would be classified a misdemeanor without the
necessity of the deleted portion. The court reasoned that since the legislature
was careful to specifically except traffic infractions from the definition of a
crime, it would have acted similarly in the case of public intoxication so as to
leave no doubt. 29 In 1942, the Appellate Division of the Fourth Department 0
dismissed a prosecution charging the defendant with escaping from prison while
confined therein for a misdemeanor,3 1 to wit: public intoxication, taking the
position that by virtue of the amendment of 1911 public intoxication was no
longer a misdemeanor. This court was not willing to accept the 1911 amendment as being merely a vain act on the part of the legislature and concluded
that it must have been intended to reduce the violation to the status of an
offense. This decision was affirmed without opinion by the Court of Appeals. 2
In 1955 the public intoxication section was amended 3 thereby bringing that
section within the general rule.
20. See N.Y. Pen. Law § 722.
21. See note 13 supra.
22. See note 15 supra.
23. Prior to the amendment of 1955; see note 33 infra.
24. N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 2 (29).
25. "The provisions of section twelve hundred and twenty-one shall not apply to the
City of New York." For New York City see N.Y. City Crim. Cts. Act §§ 120-21.
26. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1911, c. 700.
27. 249 App. Div. 54, 291 N.Y. Supp. 73 (3d Dep't 1936); but see People v. Waters, 153
Misc. 686, 257 N.Y. Supp. 864 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
28. "Where the performance of any act is prohibited by a statute, and no penalty for the
violation of such statute is imposed in any statute, the doing such act is a misdemeanor."
N.Y. Pen. Law § 29.
29. "If the Legislature by the 1911 amendment intended to remove public intoxication
from the list of crimes it would undoubtedly have made a similar exception." People v.
Reson, 249 App. Div. 54, 291 N.Y. Supp. 73 (3d Dep't 1936).
30. People v. Murphy, 263 App. Div. 1051, 33 N.Y.S.2d 963 (4th Dep't 1942).
31. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1694.
32. 288 N.Y. 613, 42 N.E.2d 612 (1942).
33. "If such charge is sustained the person found guilty of being intoxicated in public shall
be deemed guilty of an offense." N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 823.
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A complete analysis of the cases clearly demonstrates that irrespective of the
grade of the violation, unless it is expressly declared an offense, it will be held
a misdemeanor. The inconsistent results that will follow from this rule are
matters of legislative concern that undoubtedly warrant revision of the state's
penal statutes to achieve a just uniformity between grade of violation and its
classification as either a misdemeanor or an offense. Unless such action is taken
by the legislature, certain sections not yet judicially interpreted as for example,
the unlawful placing of flower pots on window sills will result in a crime rather
than an offense.
PROCEDURE
Once it has been established that the defendant is being charged with a petty
offense, what procedural distinctions exist between his rights and those of a
person charged with committing a misdemeanor? Although an offense does
not carry with it the stigma of a crime, in order to safeguard the basic concepts
of justice, the majority of procedural safeguards afforded a "criminal" are
equally available to an "offender."
StmmyAnY Ti
Inasmuch as it was the pettiness of the offense that lends itself to separation
from the more serious crimes, it is natural that the most fundamental distinction
between a crime and an offense is that the latter is never entitled to a trial by
either a common law or statutory jury but rather is triable summarily.34 The
necessity of a summary method of prosecuting offenders was recognized at the
very beginning of the development of the concept of quasi-crimes.3 3 To effect
this end the first English statutes vested summary jurisdiction in the justice of
the peace but in many instances failed in its purpose by not providing for a
simple procedure to handle these offenses.36 The result was that, though
labeled summary jurisdiction, the procedure was in fact as cumbersome as an
ordinary criminal trial.
In New York the Code of Criminal Procedure originally vested jurisdiction
over all offenses in courts of special sessions.37 It also provided 9 that one
charged with a crime over which these courts had jurisdiction could apply for
a certificate of removal if it should appear that it was reasonable that such
charge be prosecuted by indictment and trial by common law jury. It has been
held, however, that this provision does not apply to offenses.30 In addition, it
34. District of Columbia v. Colts, 232 U.S. 63 (1930) ; State v. Rodgers, 91 N.J.L. 38, 102
At. 433 (CL Err. & App. 1917); People v. Grogan, 260 N.Y. 133, 183 N.E. 273 (1932).
35. 1 Holdsworth, History of English Law 293 (1922).
36. See note 5 supra.
37. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 56. See also N.Y. Second Class Cities Law § 182; N.Y.
Village Law § 182. Within N.Y. City see N.Y.C. Crim. Cts. Act §§ 37 (Jurisdiction of
Special Sessions), 102-02a (Jurisdiction of Magistrates).

38. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 57.
[T]he fact that the legislature amended the opening paragraph of s2ction 56. by
39. "...
chapter 36S, Laws of 1948, to include 'offenses, violations of ordinances, and infractions,'
while still retaining the word 'crimes' in section 57 providing for the removal of charges
pending in courts of Special Sessions . . . we conclude was clear legislative recognition of a
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has been held that a defendant charged with an offense cannot demand to be
tried by a statutory jury of six. 40 An exception was originally made in the case
of traffic infractions, at least one court holding 41 that one charged with a traffic
infraction did have a right to be tried by a statutory jury. This court reasoned
that since the Vehicle and Traffic law provided that such offenses are to be
treated as misdemeanors for all procedural purposes the right to demand a
jury trial should also apply. An amendment to the law vitiated the effect of
providing "that no jury trial shall be allowed for
this decision by expressly
42
traffic infractions."
In a recent amendment to the Penal Law, the legislature amended that section
which grants jurisdiction over the offense of disorderly conduct43 by granting
to magistrates or other judicial officers having jurisdiction in the premises the
power to hear and determine and to render final judgment upon conviction of
disorderly conduct "or any other offense not constituting a crime. ' 44 Today
therefore, it is clearly established that magistrates have exclusive summary
jurisdiction over all petty offenses.
Consistent with this summary jurisdiction, an offender has no right to have
the incidental issue of sanity determined by a jury45 although he is entitled to
an examination for the purpose of establishing his sanity.40 As in all criminal
has no right to have the fact of "present insanity" determined
cases an offender
47
by a jury.
Finally, these hearings, although summary in form, are criminal trials. Therefore, a summary hearing constitutes jeopardy within the meaning of section 9
of the Code of Criminal Procedure and article 1, section 6 of the state constitution, 48 therefore precluding the defendant from being tried again for the same
offense.
ARREST

The Code of Criminal Procedure permits a peace officer to arrest a person
for a crime committed in his presence 49 provided he informs the person of his
authority and the cause of arrest, except that when the person apprehended is
in the actual commission of the crime, the officer need not state the cause of
distinction between crimes and offenses." People v. MacAffer, 282 App. Div. 287, 123 N.Y.S.
2d 204 (3d Dep't 1953).
40. People v. Rubin, 284 N.Y. 392, 31 N.E.2d 501 (1940); People v. MacAffer, 282 App.
Div. 287, 123 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dep't 1953); Cooley v. Wilder, 234 App. Div. 256, 255
N.Y. Supp. 218 (4th Dep't 1932).
41. People v. Bush, 160 Misc. 669, 290 N.Y. Supp. 495 (County Ct. 1936).
42.

N.Y. Sess. Laws 1939, c. 420.

43. N.Y. Pen. Law § 724.
44. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 272, § 1.
45. People v. Mills, 179 Misc. 58, 37 N.Y.S.2d 185 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
46. Application of Eaton, 196 Misc. 648, 92 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
47. See note 45 supra.
48. People v. Collins, 238 App. Div. 592, 265 N.Y. Supp. 475 (Ist Dep't 1933); People v.
Goldefarb, 152 App. Div. 870, 138 N.Y. Supp. 62 (1st Dep't), afi'd, 213 N.Y. 664, 107 N.E.
1077 (1912).
49. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 177.
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arrest5 In the case of a petty offense, however, it has been held that a peace
officer has no right to arrest without a warrant unless such conduct constitutes
a breach of the peaceY1 There are some limited statutory exceptions, such as
the amendment to section 900 of the Code, authorizing the summary arrest of
certain types of disorderly persons, notably fortune tellers, and sections 890 and
894 of the Code concerning vagrants, violations which would not normally
constitute a breach of the peace.
In the case of traffic infractions the rule is not settled. In Breland v. Gray5it was held that a traffic infraction is not a crime and does not therefore come
within the meaning of the summary arrest section of the Code and by applying
the general rule concerning arrest for offenses decided there is no right to arrest
for a traffic infraction unless it constituted a breach of the peace. In this case
the defendant was arrested for parking his automobile a distance greater than
six inches from the curb.P However, in People v. Space,54 involving a speeding
violation, it was held that a traffic infraction was a crime for purposes of arrest.
The Court of Appeals in the recent case of Squadrito v. Grcibscle5 adopted the
rule of the Space case, and extended the summary arrest concept, at least in
the case of traffic infractions, to include section 180 of the Code,!; ruling that
when arresting a person for an "offense," the arresting officer has no duty to
inform the offender of the cause of arrest when he apprehends him in the actual
commission of the act. The Squadrito case involved an action for false arrest
brought by a plaintiff who was arrested for speeding, on the theory that the
arresting officer, by refusing to inform the plaintiff of the cause of arrest, had
failed to comply with the requirements of the Code and therefore the arrest
was unlawful. In upholding the arrest, the court reasoned that since the legislature has provided that traffic infractions are to be treated procedurally as
crimes, they must have intended that they be treated as crimes for the purpose
of arrest as well. Unfortunately the court did not distinguish the more fundamental problem raised by the Breland case in regard to the right of summary
arrest for mere parking violations. But however distinguishable, from a practical standpoint, the Space and Breland cases may be, there is no provision to
distinguish between types of traffic infractions made in the statute. It is inconceivable that the legislature intended to vest police officers with the authority
to arrest without a warrant in the case of a parking violation, yet the decision
50. Id. § 180.
51. People v. Philip, 284 N.Y. 235, 30 N.E.2d 4SS (1940).
52. 2 Misc. 2d 15, 37 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
53. N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § S6(5).
54. 1S2 Mifsc. 783, 51 N.Y.S.2d 509 (County Ct. 1944).
55. 1 N.Y.2d 471, 136 N.E2d 504 (1956).
56. "When arresting a person without a warrant the officer must inform him of the
authority of the officer and the cause of arrest, except when the person arrested is in the
actual commision of a crime, or is pursued immediately after an escape." N.Y. Code Crim.
Proc. § 130. In the title of section ISO the word "felony" is used in place of the word
"crime" which is in the text (one instance among many in the penal statutes demonstrating

the need for extensive revision). The court in the Squadrito case held that the body of
the statute was clear and unambiguous, consequently the title could not alter its meaning.
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in the Squadrito case would support no other conclusion. It would seem that
"the legislature has inadvertently caused a loophole to exist in the law which
the majority has chosen to fill." 57
BURDEN OF PROOF

The general criminal law principle that one is presumed to be innocent until
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt applies equally to offenses.58 In
5 9 it was held that ".
People v. Hildebrant,

.

. there should be applied in the

case of traffic infractions the criminal law rules of presumption of innocence
and the necessity of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." This court
reversed a speeding conviction based on the photographic evidence of a "photo
traffic camera" without pursuit or arrest. The state argued that it may be
presumed that the registered owner of the vehicle was operating it at the time
of the violation, thereby imposing on the owner the burden of rebutting this
presumption. The court rejected this reasoning and dismissed the conviction
saying that speeding is a personal offense and the identity of the perpetrator
thereof must be established by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Although one tried for an offense is not entitled to a trial by jury, such an
offense has all the characteristics of a criminal procedure and a conviction
eventuates in a penal judgment and execution. 0° One charged with an offense
must be warned of his right against self-incrimination. 0 ' In Lea v. MacDul, 0 2
it was held that one charged with a mere offense need not be informed of his
right to counsel but this decision would seem to be in conformity with the
decisions denying such right in the case of all crimes tried in a court of special
sessions. 0 3 This rule is prompted by the reasoning that the section of the Code
which requires that a defendant be informed of his right to the aid of counsel"4
being "a part of part 4 of the Code which has to do with 'proceedings in a
criminal action prosecuted by indictment,' has no application to cases in Special
Sessions." 65 It has been cautioned, however, that in cases where the defendant
57. Note, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 735, 737 (1956).
58. People v. Gilbert, 12 N.Y.S.2d 632 (N.Y.C. Ct. Spec. Sess., App. Part 1939).
59. 308 N.Y. 397, 126 N.E.2d 377 (1955).
60. People ex rel. Stolofsky v. Superintendent of State Institution for Male Defective
Mental Delinquents, 259 N.Y. 115, 181 N.E. 68 (1932); People v. Karnow, 204 Misc. 632,
123 N.Y.S.2d 537 (County Ct. 1953).
61. "The privilege against self-incrimination learly applies to such a proceeding and the
conduct of the trial, with respect to that privilege, should be precisely the same as that
upon a charge of misdemeanor." People v. Chlebowy, 191 Misc. 768, 78 N.Y.S.2d 596
(Sup. Ct. 1948).
62. 205 Misc. 24, 126 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Sup. Ct. 1953); People v. Hogenson, 117 N.Y.S.2d
260 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 1952).
63. People v. Johnston, 187 N.Y. 319, 79 N.. 1018 (1907); People v. Park, 92 Misc.
369, 156 N.Y. Supp. 816 (County Ct. 1915).
64. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 188.
65. People v. Yerman, 138 Misc. 272, 246 N.Y. Supp. 665 (County Ct. 1930).
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is not represented by counsel, the court must be diligent to protect every right
of the defendant. G6
The Penal Law provides that anyone who commits an act which would
make him an accessory if the principal crime committed were a felony, may be
punished as a principal, "if the crime be a misdemeanor."GT Despite this
unequivocal language, it has been held that one who aids or abets in the offense
of disorderly conduct may be convicted as a principalCs
In People v. Erickson,69 it was held that an offense does not come within
that section of the Criminal Code which requires that a confession be supported
by some additional evidence. This case involved the offense of being a disorderly person and express provision is made in the Code that in such cases a
confession alone will support a conviction.70 However, applying the same
reasoning as has been applied when the courts have considered the duty to
inform a defendant of his right to counsel, it follows that this ruling Should be
equally applicable to all offenses, since the section of the Code requiring that
a confession be supported by additional evidence is also found in part 4, relating
to actions prosecuted by indictment.
An offense is not a crime within the meaning of the section of the Civil Practice Act 71 which admits evidence of a prior conviction for a crime to impeach
the credibility of a witness.72 Finally, a conviction for an offense gives the
defendant the same right to appeal, including appeal to the Court of Appeals,
as exists in the case of a misdemeanor, and such actions are governed by the
rules concerning appeals as found in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3
CONCLUSION
Analysis shows that violations of the penal statutes have been held to be
crimes unless it is expressly provided that it shall be something less than a
misdemeanor. Comparisons, such as between penalty provided or apparent
gravity of the wrong, display little consistency and cannot affect the rule.
Further, looking beyond the words of the statute can only serve to create a
problem where presently none exists.
Petty offenses serve an important function in the law by permitting the
expeditions prosecution of the more common minor violations of law which
could not possibly be handled by the time consuming process of a regular
criminal trial However, in order to afford full protection of the law to a
defendant these offenses are treated procedurally as misdemeanors in every
66. See note 61 supra.
67. N.Y. Pen. Law § 27.
68. People v. Pearson, 188 Misc. 744, 69 N.Y..2d 242 (N.Y.C. CL Spm. Sczs., App.
Part 1947).
69. 171 Misc. 937, 13 N.Y.S.2d 997 (N.Y.C. Mlagis. CL), rev'd on other grounds, 283

N.Y. 210, 28 N.E2d 381 (1940).
70. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 901.
71. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 350.
72. People v. Mlealey, 287 N.Y. 39, 38 N.E.2d 21 (1941); McQuage v. City of New York,
285 App. Div. 249, 136 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1st Dep't 1943).
73. See note 67 supra.
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respect consistent with the purpose they are intended to serve.7 4 But any law
which subjects a citizen to summary trial and punishment, however necessary
it may be, is fraught with the danger of abuse. It is imperative that the courts
remain vigilant to curtail such abuses if and when they arise.
74. Certain procedural modifications have been made by statute in regard to traffic
infractions. Section 335-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure for example, requires that
before accepting a plea of guilty to a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, the defendant
must be .warned that he is liable to revocation of his driving privileges as well as to a penalty.
Section 335(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that under given circumstances

a plea of guilty to such violations may be submitted by mail, thereby waiving in such
cases the requirement of submitting a personal plea as required in the case of other
offenses. Gross v. MacDuff, 284 App. Div. 786, 135 N.Y.S.2d 435 (3d Dep't 1954).

